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This study was undertaken to discover whether unit cohesion is
systematically related to unit effectiveness in a Navy context. To this
end, correlation analysis was conducted on personnel turnover rates
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Assessment scores. Maintenance and Material Management (3M)
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I. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this thesis is to discover whether unit cohesion is
systematically related to unit effectiveness in a Navy context. This thesis
discusses the nature of unit cohesion, its importance to military institu-
tions over the years, and how it might be measured to assess its impact
on unit performance. Further, it proposes that unit cohesion, which has
received much attention in Army and Marine Corps contexts, is also
important to the Navy. The focal question of interest is: Do cohesion
levels affect the performance of U.S. Navy surface ships? A methodology
is proposed for analyzing personnel turnover rates and unit performance
measures for possible relationships; these relationships may suggest that
cohesion levels indeed affect performance.
A. ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS
The first chapter discusses the purpose of the thesis and describes
the major elements of this study. Chapter II offers examples of previous
writings and research on cohesion and effectiveness. The literature sur-
veyed includes some of the "classics" in the field as well as current ana-
lytical research. Concluding this chapter is a discussion of a major
component of unit cohesion: personnel turbulence. A methodology is pro-
posed in Chapter III for using personnel turnover as a cohesion measure
to assess its impact on unit performance criteria. Data analysis is the
subject of Chapter IV. Results are presented in the form of correlations
between turnover rates and various unit performance measures. Chapter
V deals with the author's interpretations of the data. Are significant rela-
tionships evident? What are the uses and limitations of the data? Chap-
ter V closes with conclusions and recommendations for further research.
If research results point to measurable relationships among cohesion,
turnover, and performance, there may be ways the U.S. Navy can mani-
pulate personnel systems to foster healthy, and perhaps more effective,
unit environments.
B. BACKGROUND AND BASIS FOR RESEARCH
Unit cohesion has been widely studied for years within the Army and
the Marine Corps. There have been volumes written on the importance of
cohesion in warfighting units. These volumes range from pieces by clas-
sical military thinkers to analytical studies of current U.S. Army units.
Generally, cohesion has been defined as the extent to which an individ-
ual desires to remain a part of an organization as well as the extent to
which the individual will place the organization's welfare above his own.
It has been generally accepted that cohesive units fight better than
units that are not (discussed in Chapter II). Many stories out of World
War Two, the Korean War, and the Vietnam War have demonstrated how
effective cohesive units can be. It has been sadly observed how poorly
U.S. Army units performed against the German Wehrmacht and North
Vietnamese. Although the Allies eventually won the war in Europe, for
example, man for man, German soldiers outperformed American soldiers.
Many historians owe this fact to the tightly cohesive nature of German
army units.
There has been precious little study of cohesion within the Navy.
Typical research has focused on the ground or infantry brand of war-
fare—the "hand-to-hand combat" aspect of battle. Due to the technical
nature of naval warfare, as well as the independent nature of naval oper-
ations, it is easy to see why navy cohesion studies may not have been
undertaken.
It is submitted that studies of unit cohesion within a Navy context
would indeed yield important results. If unit cohesion in one brand of
warfighting is as important as the literature suggests, then the effects of
cohesion within other warfighting contexts deserves exploration.
C. SCOPE
To begin a study of unit cohesion within the Navy, the scope is nar-
rowed to cohesion of crews of surface ships of the U.S. Pacific Fleet. The
research questions above are posed and assessed in this context. Within
this surface ship framework, a turnover measure first is used to assess
levels of cohesion aboard the ships. Once measures are obtained for each
ship, they are used as a basis for comparison against each ship's perfor-
mance criteria. Relationships between turnover rates and performance
measures are then analyzed for possible interpretive conclusions about
the effects of unit cohesion.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW
The term "cohesion" has found its way into the language of military
thinkers for years. Nearly all the classical writers, many of whom were
battle veterans, either alluded to the phenomenon or specifically
addressed it. Over time, a literature has evolved ranging from strictly
anecdotal accountings of combat-unit battlefield behavior to more recent
attempts at pursuing analytical explanations as to why men fight. The
basic questions include: Why do some military combat units continue to
fight (and often win) against extraordinary odds? What is it that causes
members of cohesive military units to subordinate their own safety to the
welfare of their unit? How c£in peacetime military establishments create
an atmosphere in those units that in times of crisis will be called upon to
place themselves in harm's way?
Common themes can be found in many of the writings on cohesion.
What follows is a review of the literature that includes many of these
themes, such as definitions of cohesion, some of the internal and exter-
nal components of cohesion, historical aspects, and the relationship
between cohesion and effectiveness.
A. HUMAN ELEMENTS
These voices, these quiet words, these footsteps in the trench behind
me recall me at a bound from the terrible loneliness and fear of
death by which I had been almost destroyed. They are more to me
than life, those voices, they are more than motherliness and more
than fear; they are the strongest, most comforting thing there is
anywhere, they are the voices of my comrades. (Erich Remarque, pp.
181-182)
Erich Remarque's words from All Quiet on the Western Front make an
important point about modem warfare: although so much attention is
paid to the hardware of war— the guns, airplanes, and bombs— it is the
fighting men with their attendant fighting spirit who ultimately win or
lose a battle or war.
The fact that it is the human element that wins wars has not been
lost on generations of military leaders and historians. Indeed, Carl Von
Clausewitz believed that the spirit of fighting forces was of paramount
significance and that "...moral forces [were] amongst the most important
subjects in War." (Clausewitz, 1918, p. 177) Even today, military leaders
who are confronted with accelerating technological advances continue to
realize the critical importance of men who are willing to fight. General
Edward C. Meyer, writing during his tenure as Chief of Staff of the U.S.
Army, stated that "the most modern equipment in the world is useless
without motivated individuals drilled into cohesive units with sound
leadership at all levels." (Meyer, 1980. p. 4) The U. S. Navy's Chief of
Naval Operations, Admiral Csirlisle A. H. Trost (1987), has also called for
renewed emphasis on the human element in the military.
This human element in warfare has been distilled over the years as
the will to fight. Hauser (1980) asks from where this will comes, how it is
measured, and, if found lacking, how it is acquired. He proposes a num-
ber of psychosocial factors that compel men to fight: submission to
authority, fear, loyalty, and pride. One might quickly conclude that these
factors cannot be directly measured; however, there have been some
attempts at developing useful measures to differentiate between those
who will fight and those who will not.
During the Korean War, Egbert, et al. (1958) used questionnaires
and inventories to identify various traits common to soldiers who would
be labeled as fighters or non-fighters. The soldiers were asked about their
background histories, interests, and their attitudes towards various ideas
and activities; they were also given intelligence and aptitude tests. In
their findings, Egbert, et al. reported that, among other things, a "fighter"
tended to be more intelligent, be emotionally stable, healthy, masculine,
have a stable home life, be socially responsible and tolerant, and be
accepted by his peers.
Further work on developing human element measures was offered
by Juri Toomepuu (1981). The purpose of his work was to find quantita-
tive relationships between soldier capabilities and the combat and cost-
effectiveness of weapons, units, and forces. He found that there is a
strong relationship between the social adaptation of soldiers and their
combat effectiveness.
Others have noted the importance of social factors common to suc-
cessful fighting units. Havron (1984) criticizes modem combat readiness
reporting by noting that today's measures are objective counts of assets
in w^hich subjective measures are ignored. These subjective measures
should include competence, trained performance, effects of disintegrative
factors (drug abuse, indiscipline, racial disharmony, alienation), and
commitment. The ways in which these factors interact "have spelled the
difference between military victory and defeat...throughout history."
(Havrbn, 1984, p. 3) Havron believes that these social dimensions, in
addition to leadership and morale, "reflect the spiritual strength of a unit
and thus limit or enhance the unit's warfighting capability." (Havron,
1984, p. 12)
Thus far in this review, the soldier and the unit have been identified.
An investigation into the link between the two should reveal the impor-
tant dynamics that make the unit greater than the sum of its parts.
B. COHESION: WHAT IS IT?
I hold it to be one of the simplest truths of war that the thing which
enabled an infantry soldier to keep going with his weapons is the
near presence or presumed presence of a comrade, (Marshall, 1947,
p. 42)
It has been shown that the human element is of paramount impor-
tance in the winning of battles. But what is it that ties the individual to
his unit? Clausewitz attempted to identify factors in a military unit which
he saw as clear indicators that the link between the unit and its men was
healthy, strong, and disposed toward common goals. Focusing on the
soldier, Clausewitz believed that fundamental change must occur in the
man: the soldier "must lose that impulse to unbridled activity and exer-
cise of force which is... characteristic in the individual, and submit
[himself] to demands of a higher kind, to obedience, order, rule, and
method." (Clausewitz, 1918, p. 181) Clausewitz's work is replete with
grand references like an "esprit de corps," a "corporate spirit," and a
"bond of union." He understood that fighting troops were not "held
together merely by the glue of service-regulations and a drill book."
(Clausewitz, 1918, p. 185) However close to identifying that "glue" that
keeps units together, Clausewitz could not throw off the fact that this
force would "escape from all book-analysis." (Clausewitz, 1918, p. 177)
His challenge would be accepted, and over the years military thinkers
have been attempting to pin down what this "glue" is.
S. L. A. Marshall wrote of cohesion following World War II. He dis-
puted the claims of others that World War II soldiers were strengthened
by "battle-seasoning" and "mental toughening." Believing that deteriora-
tion of a unit's mental and moral fiber resulted from the constant cycle of
battle and rest, Marshall felt that the difference between successful and
unsuccessful units was a steady growth in unit confidence and tactical
cohesion. He points out:
With the growth of experience troops learn to apply the lessons of
contact and communicating, and out of these things comes the tac-
tical cohesion which enables a group of individuals to make the most
of their united strength and stand steady in the face of sudden
emergency. (Marshall. 1947, p. 124)
^
The years following Marshall's landmark work saw many attempts at
massaging this "cohesion" concept in order to define it more clearly,
break it down into component parts, and then generalize it to the extent
that its applicability would be more universal.
iThere are doubts regarding General Marshall's work. Hackworth
(1989) disputes many of the general's claims about his combat
experience, saying that most of them were simply untrue or at least
exaggerated. He calls Marshall a braggart who tended to embellish war
stories for the sake of the possible commercial success of his books. In
short, Hackworth felt Marshall was a voyeur warrior for whom "the truth
never got in the way of a good story." (Hackworth, 1989, p. 585)
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Bickel, et al. have defined cohesion as "the degree to which members
of a group or organization are willing to subordinate their individual
welfare to that of the group and to conform to the standards of behavior,
or norms, of the group." (Bickel, et al., 1984, p. 1) Further, the authors
define cohesion in a military context as "the bonding together of members
of an organization or unit in such a way as to sustain their will and
commitment to each other, their unit, and the mission." (Bickel, et al.,
1984, p. 4) Hauser puts cohesion in even a more "military" context in his
definition: "the ability of a military unit to hold together, to sustain mis-
sion effectiveness despite combat stress." (Hauser, 1980, p. 204)
Giving some form to a definition of cohesion. Nelson and Berry offer
that cohesion is "a group property. . .with some degree of informal struc-
ture reflecting interpersonal sentiments...and characterized by feelings of
*we-ness'...and 'esprit de corps'." (Nelson and Berry, 1968, p. 63) Sarke-
sian, making a connection between the individual and the society in
which he may find himself, derives his definition of cohesion: "the atti-
tudes and commitment of individual soldiers to the integrity of the unit,
the 'will' to fight, and the degree to which these are in accord with soci-
etal values and expectations." (Sarkesian, 1980, p. 11) Stressing further
the importance of the larger society, Lewy believes cohesion is a function
"of the political and social fabric and of the willingness of...society to
support the military." (Lewy, 1980, p. 105)
Griffen has suggested that cohesion is the same as a unit's potential
and that it is a function of bonding and leadership. He believes that
bonding and cohesion are different and separate constructs— the link
between the two is purpose. Thus, his definition of cohesion: "the unity of
effort of individuals in an organization toward the accomplishment of
organizational goals." (Griffen, 1989, p. 2) Griffen echoes Hoiberg, who
also breaks cohesion from bonding: "to be cohesive, a group must have a
mission or objective." (Hoiberg, 1980, p. 231)
Although many have offered varying definitions of cohesion, there
are several common themes. The essence of cohesion is that there is a
link, or bond, between the individual and a group. This bond is then
translated into a will or commitment to pursue the group's objectives.
Cohesion is of interest to anyone involved in an organizational environ-
ment, but it is of particular concern to military leaders. What are the
components of cohesion? Does cohesion positively affect performance or
effectiveness? And if it does, how do military organizations create cohe-
sion? Before considering these questions, a brief historical review is in
order. Here, one can plainly see that cohesion has played a significant
role in military conflict through the years.
C. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES
This section raises the issue of how powerful cohesion can be during
crises. There are countless anecdotal instances in which unit cohesive-
ness played decisive roles. Many times it was this human element, or a
lack of it. which determined the outcome of conflict.
During the winter of 1939-1940. Russia invaded Finland. What fol-
lowed was some of the most vicious fighting ever in the crudest of envi-
ronments. The Russians had no idea that the tenaciousness with which
the Finns fought would cost them more than 10 Russian lives for each
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Finn. As the Russians made their way up the Karelian Isthmus and
across the Finnish frontier, lumbering in heavy tanks in a rigid, methodi-
cal advance, the Finns were relentless. The mostly reservist Finnish
Army, faced with insurmountable odds, employed small, cohesive units
on snow skis or in light vehicles. By March, when the Finns had to
surrender, this engagement was one of the most costly and bloody cam-
paigns in Russian history. The Russians were stunned by how coordi-
nated and committed the Finnish defensive forces were. This was a
lesson in unit cohesion: invasion forces must include in their assess-
ments of opposing forces more than numbers of tanks, planes, and rifles.
(Shirer, 1960, and Stokesbury, 1980)
World War II history is full of episodes in which cohesion translated
into tenacity, commiitment, dedication to cause, and willingness to sacri-
fice. From the Warsaw ghetto to Corregidor, cohesion allowed groups of
individuals to perform at levels greater than would be expected of simi-
larly manned, but non-cohesive, organizations. For an example, one can
turn to the German Wehrmacht. In their important work, Shils and
Janowitz examiined cohesion in that World War II military institution.
They asked why, with the odds mounting against them near the end of
the war, did German forces not disintegrate? Further, why did many
German units become even more effective fighting forces as the German
collapse appeared imminent? Shils and Janowitz attributed the Wehr-
macht's ability to continue the struggle to unit cohesion. Though they
believed Wehrmacht cohesion was a construct of many factors, the
authors treated it as the primary reason for many German successes.
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Shils and Janowitz summarized their findings as to why a German sol-
dier fought: "...[A]s long as he felt himself to be a member of his primary
group," bound to its behavioral norms and demands, "...his soldierly
achievement was likely to be good." (Shils and Janowitz, 1975, p. 181)
These findings are consistent with definitions of cohesion discussed ear-
lier in this chapter.
2
Twentieth-century American military history is a repeated tale of the
failure to recognize the importance of unit cohesion to the success of
engaged combat units. During the Korean War, in which recognition for
individual (rather than unit) performance became the rule, and in which
personnel were rotated on an individual basis, unit cohesion suffered.
Straub (1988) writes of the frustrations of Army leaders with personnel
policies that served to exacerbate their efforts to effectively train and fight
during the war. The bonds among men and between men and their units
were not taking hold.
The Vietnam war provides the most recent example of how the lack
of military cohesion results in a military unit's inability to perform.
Hoiberg (1980) writes that cohesion and effectiveness were high in the
early years; however, as the conflict wore on, both cohesion and effec-
tiveness deteriorated. She attributes this deterioration to several factors.
2When considering the experiences of the Finns and Germans, one
could assert that they had no choice but to fight with such abandon—
their backs were against a wall. However, one might also find that it was
those frightful pressures that in fact strengthened unit cohesion. Soldiers
may have felt that their chances for survival were better if they
maintained unit integrity.
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including changes in leadership styles, the increase in the number of
officers, and the Army's rotation policy. Using the Vietnam war as a case
study in their comprehensive commentary on the organizational nature
of the U. S. Army, Gabriel and Savage (1978) blame much of the Army's
inability to carry out operations on the loss of cohesion at the unit level.
Through the years, other militaries have recognized the vital signifi-
cance of unit cohesion. In fact, cohesion is an important part of the tra-
dition in which many militaries are entrenched. For example, the British
military has been admired for "tightly knit, highly skilled units that rely
on cohesion to generate the fighting power needed to overcome numeri-
cally superior but less cohesive opponents." (Straub, 1988, p. 7) Stewart,
in her examination of the South Atlantic conflict of 1982, reported that
British troops exhibited high morale, esprit and cohesion which were
"bom of a four-hundred year tradition of overseas engagements involving
long supply lines, joint operations and amphibious landings." (Stewart,
1988, p. Ill) On the other hand, when Stewart studied the Argentines,
she found that, for the most part, they lacked the societal factors, train-
ing, and confidence that the British so successfully employed to develop
cohesion.
The most recent demonstration of the power of cohesion is occurring
today in the Middle East. Ya'ari discusses how the seeds of the Pales-
tinian intifada, or uprising, were sown within Israel's own prisons. He
reports that tens of thousands of Palestinians have passed through
Israeli prisons as terrorists, and that
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over the years, in full view of their Israeli jailers, Palestinian security
prisoners...built an independent network whose cohesion, intellec-
tual verve, and rich store of experience would manifest themselves in
all their power during the Palestinian uprising. (Ya'ari, 1989, p. 22)
The prison experience was used as an opportunity for growth; the pris-
oners came out more self-assured and committed to the Palestinian
cause. Indeed, of the 20 or so of the intifada's highest leaders (as
opposed to the frenzied streetfighters), only two or three did not serve
time in Israeli prisons. The shared experiences and mutual risks taken
during incarceration resulted in a nearly invincible will on the part of the
new cohesive and resolved Palestinian movement inside the occupied
territories.
D. COMPONENTS OF COHESION
A substantial literature has evolved that studies the components of
cohesion. What are cohesion's building blocks? How do military organi-
zations assemble these blocks to create viable fighting units? What are
threats to cohesion? The answers to these and related questions can be
found in many areas, including sociology, psychology, leadership, man-
agement, personnel practices, political science, and military theory.
1. Primary Groups
Shortly following World War II, the concept of the primary group
on the battlefield was introduced. Followers of this concept believe that
strong primary group solidarity results in effective fighting units. Shils
and Janowitz hypothesize that the German soldier during the war fought
not so much because of ideology, but because he was part of a "social
unit which satisfied some of his primary needs." (Shils and Janowitz,
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1975, p. 181) Keegan also believes in tJiis very rudimentary explanation
for tightly knit units devoid of political or cultural orientation:
"...ordinary soldiers do not think of themselves, in life-and-death situa-
tions, as subordinate members of whatever formal military organization it
is to which authority has assigned them, but as equals within a very tiny
group...." (Keegan, 1976, p. 53)
Little (1964) sees the primary group as a network of interper-
sonal relationships formed by buddies. These buddy relationships were
based on an expectation of mutual loyalty, on understanding, and on
offering or acceptance of help. According to Wesbrook (1980), these net-
works, or groups, developed an atmosphere in which soldiers would be
willing to fight in terms of their involvement with each other. Typically,
the primary group was made up of those who liked each other, were
dependent on one another, and who had similar values and goals.
In order for the primary group, in which individuals are bonded
to each other, to become bonded to the unit, a commonly cited determi-
nant is shared experiences. Wesbrook (1980) echoes Marshall when he
writes that where primary group bonds occur naturally, unit bonds often
must be created. Janowitz and Little would agree: "Cohesive primary
groups do not just occur but are fashioned and developed by complex
military institutions." (Janowitz and Little, 1974, p. 94) The shared expe-
rience seems to be that which the military can easily use to create
cohesion. Janowitz and Little stress that it "may be crucial...that the
members (of the primary group)...have gone through some group
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experiences which demonstrate to them the value of social solidarity."
(Janowitz and Little, 1974, p. 96)
2. Society
The extent to which societal factors affect unit cohesion seems
to have been somewhat ignored by those studying the primary group.
However, some do believe that society at large does affect cohesion on the
battlefield.
Clausewitz (1918) includes as one of his chief moral powers the
national feeling of the state that was at war. He believes that this
"feeling" did affect the ability of armies to fight. Others through the years
have followed Clausewitz in this belief. Charles Moskos, in Beaumont
and Snyder, believes in society's role in formulating a winning military
force: "...primary groups maintain the soldier in his combat role only
when he has an underlying commitment to the worth of the larger social
system for which he is fighting." (Beaumont and Snyder, 1980, p. 33)
What are the social factors that a culture employs (consciously
or otherwise) to compel men to fight? Hauser (1980) has suggested that a
man will fight because he is enculturated to do so. The soldier submits
himself to authority, rules, and regimen not so much because he enjoys
them but because of social pressures. In addition to being loyal to his
buddies, as discussed above, the fighting man has been indoctrinated to
be loyal to his leaders, his unit, and his country. He is also taught to be
proud of his country and unit. A final societal factor presented by Hauser
is fear: the soldier will be naturally fearful of physical danger, but it is
the fear of disgrace that is a social pressure. Hauser believes that units
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manned by soldiers most or all of whom have been truly raised to con-
duct themselves within a society's behavioral norms will be cohesive.
Others have cited the importance of the relationships among
soldiers, militaries, and societies. Soldiers need to feel that they are sup-
ported by the society from which they come. Ya'ari discusses how the
40,000 prisoners (not quite soldiers, but fighting men nonetheless) who
passed through the Israeli jails were greeted as heroes when they
returned home: they "were a whole new class of Palestinian society."
(Ya'ari, 1989, p. 28) Toomepuu also believes that men fight more effec-
tively when it is clear where the larger society stands. He is less generous
to today's larger society when he offers his recipe for fighting which "is
legitimated by hardly anything less than a severe, clearly perceived
threat. ..to the fundamental tenets of [a] way of life." (Toomepuu, 1981,
p. 41)
One may be alarmed by the fact that the will to fight is inherent
in society at large; however, one only needs to recall domestic events in
the United States during the Vietnam war to understand the relationship
between society and the soldier. Lewy (1980) writes about America's
Vietnam War experience and aptly describes the relationship between
cohesion and society: "Military cohesion is a consequence of the cohesion
of the political and social fabric and of the willingness of that society to
support the military." (Lewy, 1980, p. 105)
The responsibility of tying society at large to the soldier in an
effort to build a cohesive fighting force falls on the military establish-
ment. How does a military organization create cohesive units? What does
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the military need from society? What does it not need from society? What
are the societal attributes the military should recognize?
3. The Military Establishment and Cohesion
Military organizations are tasked with taking society's youths
and fashioning them into cohesive fighting units which will endure under
stress. Keeping in mind how the larger society affects the outcome of this
endeavor, it is instructive to examine how changes in American societal
norms have created new challenges to a military organization's ability to
create cohesion.
Many writers, especially those who have examined the Vietnam
and post-Vietnam War eras, have lamented the fact that there has been a
steady degradation in military cohesion in the American Armed Forces.
They tend to blame changing societal norms, technology, and economics.
Their arguments are couched in the language of professional orientation
models and leadership/management theory. Bickel, et al. (1984), for
example, in their cohesion study, discuss service members' migration
from institutional to occupational models of service. The service member
characterized as serving within the institutional model answers, accord-
ing to Moskos, to a calling or "a purpose transcending individual self-
interest in favor of a presumed higher good." (Moskos, 1977, p. 2) On the
other hand, the occupational model is characterized by remunerative
controls; it works like a marketplace in which contractual relationships
are established and the enterprising interest will prevail. (Bickel, et al.,
1984)
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There are two major reasons for the shift to the occupational
model of service. The technological revolution has altered the way in
which military people relate to each other and their units. People are
technically trained to perform specific operations on specific equipment;
functional units are broken down into smaller groups along technical
lines, thus reducing face-to-face interaction and threatening unit integ-
rity (Bickel, et al., 1984). Remington (1986) discusses these relatively new
organizational phenomena in a "generalist versus specialist" framework.
As homogeneous units are fractured into subgroups of technical experts,
the "greater good" is subordinated to the occupational interests of the
subgroups.
The second factor responsible for the shift to the occupational
model of service is what Straub (1988) calls the notion of the primacy of
the individual. Rooted in American heritage, the United States' experi-
ment in democracy is attempting to empower, above all, the individual.
That a society is protecting individual rights above all else presents chal-
lenges to a military establishment which must homogenize its fighting
forces into cohesive units.
The Armed Forces must work in this changing social environ-
ment. Many have suggested that some of the changes described above
are related to a degradation in cohesion. One can examine how the
Armed Forces have responded over the years to their changing world to
discover whether, in fact, this degradation is occurring. The answers lie
in leadership, management, and personnel practices.
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During World War II, U.S. Army General George C. Marshall
knew tJie war was going to be long. America's relatively new management
practices to which General Marshall had to turn (analysis, decision
modeling, etc.) had serious consequences in terms of military cohesion
(Gabriel and Savage, 1978). Marshall's manpower planners viewed man-
power as a resource; individual men could be replaced or accounted for
like parts of a tank or an airplane (Straub, 1988). A military unit was
viewed as a group of individuals rather than as a like-minded whole. This
notion of treating manpower as a resource gave rise to the individual
replacement system. In this system, combat casualties were replaced
individually. A new soldier would be introduced to a combat unit already
in the field made up of men he had never seen before. On average, he,
one of the new soldiers, was more likely to suffer a combat casualty dur-
ing his first few days on the battlefield than were the other members of
the unit into which he was being assimilated. (Straub, 1988)
The trend of weakening cohesion continued during the Korean
and Vietnam wars. Again, one can look to military personnel practices for
clues about how this weakening occurred. These centralized practices
served to destroy unit cohesiveness by placing the importance of an indi-
vidual's safety or career over the unit's ability to endure. During Korea,
in the interest of fairness to the individual, a combat soldier would earn
points which eventually would get him removed from the combat zone
(Straub, 1988). He would leave and another soldier, unknown to the rest
of the unit, would be ordered in as a replacement; not surprisingly,
cohesion suffered (Straub. 1988).
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The Vietnam war found the Army trying to be fair once again.
The individual replacement system remained intact. To make matters
worse, as many officers as possible were rotated through combat duties
including command; their tours were designed to enhance an officer's
career and were as short as six months. The consequence was that the
enlisted soldier could not identify with his leadership; cohesion suffered
as the combat troops perceived that their officers were not willing to fight
and die with them. (Gabriel and Savage, 1978)
Consistent with the move toward the occupational model of ser-
vice and the notion of primacy of the individual, Gabriel and Savage
blame much of what occurred in Vietnam on changing values. The ethos
of service personnel had apparently moved from selfless "gladitorial"
stereotypes to self-centered managerial imperatives. A military unit con-
sisting of individuals, each engaged in self-serving activities, is not going
to enjoy the fruits of cohesion, as Gabriel and Savage observe:
It is this sense of belonging, of sharing common values, and of being
unique (the group) that defines a truly cohesive military unit. It is
these factors which... motivate the individual soldier to stand and
fight and to risk death in the service of his comrades. (Gabriel and
Savage, 1978, p. 21)
How can a military organization create an atmosphere in which
soldiers feel a sense of belonging? How are a unit's values transferred to
the soldiers? How is it that the military can foster an environment in
which soldiers share common experiences? Lessons from the past point
to personnel turnover within a unit. A unit in which officers are rotated
frequently or men are replaced in a random fashion has a difficult time
creating cohesion. In short, unit personnel stability has been shown to be
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a central theme in promoting cohesion. The remainder of this section
focuses on unit stabiUty and its relationship to cohesion and
performance.
4. Personnel Turbulence
It has been shown that there are several components to cohe-
sion; a review of these has ranged from such broad topics as the larger
society's norms to narrower subjects such as a man's psychological pro-
file as he enters service. Most of these factors are out of the military's
control. However, the military can effect changes within its own person-
nel system. The following is a review of the literature on turnover and its
relationship to cohesion and performance.
In Lewis Sorley's call for an overhaul in military performaince
criteria, he points to personnel turnover as the major determinant in
degraded unit performance. Sorley stresses that there is great value in
building among men shared values and outlooks to lead them in tasks
which are difficult, dangerous, and demanding. He notes that achieving
these ends takes time and stability; therefore, "turbulence of personnel in
a unit must be seen as a primary indicator of weakened coherence."
(Sorley. 1980, p. 77) W^en turnover is high enough, a full-time job is
made of assimilating and integrating new arrivals to a unit. This
expanded job weakens the unit's ability to perform.
Other writers agree. Phipps, for example, observes that in a
stable unit, over time, "inspiration comes from a relationship of mutual
trust and self-confidence, of strong group loyalty, and discipline."
(Phipps, 1982, p. 2) In an environment of personnel turbulence, fighting
men lose confidence in their leaders and in themselves. Kellett notes that
generally there is "a relationship between long service within a certain
unit and high morale." (Kellett, 1982, p. 42)
The short tours of duty during Vietnam (discussed above) had
beneficial effects on individual morale, but the military paid a high price
in terms of personnel stability. Lewy (1980) is one of many who have dis-
cussed how this turbulence weakened unit cohesion and effectiveness. In
a paper on military disintegration, Wesbrook (1980) cites personnel sta-
bility as one of the most important conditions for strong unit cohesion
and the avoidance of disintegration in the face of danger. Thiemann, in
Sorley (1980), very adroitly ties these ideas together:
Building confidence takes time, as does building the competence
from which confidence derives. Neither can be achieved in an organi-
zation...whose people move like tumbleweeds in the desert wind.
(Sorley, 1980, p. 76)
The U. S. Army has responded to the overwhelming evidence
that personnel turnover is related to cohesion. In 1981, it established the
New Manning System, which consists of the Cohesion, Operational
Readiness and Training (COHORT) unit movement system and the Regi-
mental System. The COHORT system was designed to tighten cohesion
through unit movements, as opposed to individual replacements. The
Regimental System would unify soldiers and their battalions; the soldiers
would be affiliated with the same stable regiment throughout their
careers. COHORT would begin at enlistment, when the soldier could
select the Regimental/COHORT option. The recruits would undergo their
initial training (boot camp) together and upon completion would be
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assigned to a COHOI^ unit, where they would join their chain of com-
mand. Eventually, they would deploy overseas together. This new system
was designed to promote cohesion by promoting stability and reducing
turnover. The soldiers could, align their allegiance to their units over the
long term; they now could permanently identify with their units, which
would be rotated in toto with other cohesive units. (Wong, 1985)
Results have been good. Strong bonding has occurred in these
units. Wong (1985) reports that COHORT units do indeed have more
stability, perform better than non-COHORT units, and reenlist more of
their soldiers. In short, "COHORT soldiers are more competitive, possess
strong family feelings in their units, have lower attrition rates and strong
horizontal bonding." (Wong. 1985, p. 13) Unfortunately, as Straub (1988)
reports, the system has begun to weaken as the Army tries to balance the
needs of individual career progression and unit cohesion.
5. The U.S. Navy and Personnel Turbulence
Almost all the cohesion literature from the classics to the pres-
ent deals with army units. Most who have studied the phenomenon have
done so in what they perceive as the most human of the warfighting envi-
ronments—the infantry unit on the battlefield. But what about naval
forces? For instance, is it unreasonable to expect that the same societal,
technological, and psychological factors discussed in the literature would
apply to cohesion in the U.S. Navy? There is no reason to expect that
sailors and soldiers on the day of their enlistments into the U.S. Armed
Forces have significantly different social and psychological profiles. This
thesis assumes that cohesion in Navy units is affected by many of the
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same determinants as in the Army. More specifically, the focus is on the
controllable factor of personnel turnover and its relationship to unit per-
formance on naval surface ships.
Thorndyke and Weiner (1980) have identified turnover as a
major obstacle in keeping Navy teams together. Embarking on a major
research effort to find ways to improve Navy team training, they believe
that Navy personnel policies limit team performance. They note the
paucity of research in this area and suggest that turnover must be costly
to overall performance beyond levels predicted by simple aggregation of
individual skills.
The Center for Naval Analyses has made preliminary efforts at
recognizing turnover and its use as an indicator of the strength of cohe-
sion in a naval context. To begin, Domabyl, et al. (1987) defined turnover
as a rate based on the number of new personnel, or gains, reporting
aboard a ship. With this measurement technique, they then found that
mean annual turnover rates for all ships is about 44 percent. They also
found that turnover does not vary substantially over time, by ship type,
or even over deployment cycle. Continuing on her own, Domabyl (Sept.
1987) suggests that there is a relationship between unit cohesion and
readiness. She asserts that the individual replacement system in effect
today causes continuous turnover and degrades unit training readiness,
an idea consistent with the literature thus far examined.
Reeves (1982) attempted to find whether personnel turbulence
affected performance. He hypothesized that personnel turbulence influ-
ences the performamce or output of members of a unit. For the purposes
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of his study. Reeves defined performance in terms of Navy Casualty
Report (CASF^P) data converted to maintenance downtime. His turnover
rate was determined using the Navy Personnel Research and Develop-
ment Center's Survival Tracking File. Descriptive data included length of
service, years of education, age, etc. of personnel on 40 ships. The data
did not support any correlations between turnover and his particular
performance measure.
Although Reeves' data did not support a relationship between
turnover and a measure of ship performance, it is proposed that his
hypothesis, as well as similar hypotheses by others, is not without merit.
A methodology by which relationships between turnover and performance
are assessed can be developed without great difficulty; given the above
literature survey, it should be intuitively appealing. However, the diffi-
culty lies in identifying performance measures. Researchers have been
pulling their collective hair out for years in attempts to find performance
measures that are truly useful in identifying those attributes which make
one effort more effective than the other. The remainder of this paper con-
tinues this pursuit with the idea that turnover, as a determinant of
cohesion, affects unit performance.
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III. METHODOLOGY
A review of the literature has shown that many hypothesize that per-
sonnel turnover is an indicator of weakened unit cohesion and that
degraded unit performance results from lowered cohesion. In this thesis,
an attempt is made to quantitatively express this hypothesis.
A. SELECTION OF MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS
After a review of the literature, discussions with type commander
staff officials, and a review of the author's at-sea experiences, measures
of shipboard effectiveness were selected. Because no one measure has yet
been identified as representing a unit's effectiveness, in this thesis seven
measures have been selected. They cover shipboard activities including
personnel matters, training, engineering, supply, and maintenance.
1. Personnel Retention Rates
A retention rate measures how many sailors aboard a unit
reenlist for another term of service or extend their current term.^ A
career counselling structure exists aboard each ship that is designed to
inform sailors about career opportunities, in-service benefits, and train-
ing and education programs available to them. A successful ship's
^Service members generally have the option to reenlist for another
full term of service or to extend their current term. Extending a current
term of service (usually up to one year) allows the member more time to
further assess his career options. He may need to extend to be eligible for
additional training, or he may have to extend to be eligible for rotation. In
short, extensions allow for flexibility.
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retention program is thought to reflect a healthy and effective command
climate.
The rates used for this study are gross retention rates over £in
18-month cycle. Gross rate equals the number of sailors who reenlisted
or extended their term of enlistment divided by the total number of ser-
vice members who reached their End of Active Obligated Service (EAOS).
The rates are given for first term, second term, and career categories.
"Term of service" refers to the enlistment period in which the service
member is serving when he or she decides to reenlist or extend.
Semi-annual retention rates are maintained by the type com-
mander. For this study, one rate for each retention category was required
for the 18-month period; the 18-month period constitutes the type com-
mander's competitive cycle. Therefore, three semi-annual retention rates
for each category were averaged. Cases that were missing one of the three
rates were kept and averaged using two rates. Cases that were missing
two or three reported rates were deleted from the study. It is expected
that personnel retention rates will be negatively correlated with turnover.
2. Supply Management Assessment (SMA)
The Supply Management Assessment measures the extent to
which a unit can effectively manage its resources. A ship's supply
department is responsible for acquiring, storing, and distributing spare
parts. It is also the crew's paymaster and hotel service provider. In a
warfare sense, the supply department is the ship's logistics support.
During the 18-month competitive cycle, the ship's supply
department undergoes a rigorous assessment of its ability to carry out its
28
missions. The department receives scores in four mission areas: level of
knowledge, sustainability, accountability, and combat support. For this
study, one score is desired. The four verbal scores provided for each ship
have been converted to numerical measures {Failure=l, Marginal=2,
Good=3, Excellent=4, Outstanding=5) and averaged for a single supply
management assessment score. It is expected that Supply Management
Assessment scores will be negatively correlated with turnover rates.
3. Maintenance and Material Management (3M) Inspection
The 3M Inspection is used to evaluate the effectiveness of each
unit's 3M program and, when deficiencies are noted, to provide com-
manding officers and cognizant commanders the information needed to
initiate corrective action. The evaluation is based on maintenance
scheduling and accomplishment over the 13-week period just prior to the
inspection.
The inspection team looks at the Recorded Accomplishment
Rate (RAR) for each work station; it then performs spot checks on two
percent of the scheduled maintenance items recorded as complete and
derives an Accomplishment Confidence Factor (ACF). The 3M perfor-
mance score is derived by multiplying the RAR by the ACF. The score is
provided on a 100 percent scale and can be used in this study as is. It is
expected that 3M inspection results will negatively correlate with
turnover.
4. Training Readiness Evaluation (TRE)
All surface units participate in training exercises in preparation
for upcoming overseas deployments. Training and readiness
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requirements are organized into a syllabus that lists in-port and at-sea
exercises in a graduated sequential order of completion.
The cycle begins during a ship's overhaul when the crew
attends formal schools. The second phase occurs after the overhaul and
includes equipment checks, operator training, and mission area team
training. The second phase is completed when the ship and crew suc-
cessfully complete the Training Readiness Evaluation. This evaluation
assesses how well the ship has completed the first two phases and deter-
mines whether it is ready to enter phase three (intermediate) training.
The purpose of phase three training is to integrate individual
and team performance into a fully developed operational entity. The
training, called Refresher Training (REFTRA), is done underway in vari-
ous readiness conditions and concludes when the ship's watch teams are
prepared for the battle group environment. The fourth, or advanced,
phase integrates team training in a fully coordinated, multiple threat
environment. This occurs as a pre-deploying battle group goes to sea and
engages in major fleet exercises.
For this study, a training/readiness measure is needed that will
vary across units. During phases one and two, a unit trains alone; it is
expected that there would be differences across ships. The problem with
using measures from phases three or four is that the goals of fhe latter
two phases are to train ships' crews to a standard. Data reflecting time-
to-reach-goal are not available. Therefore, for this paper, the Training
Readiness Evaluation, which represents a culmination of a crew's efforts
during phases one and two, is used.
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The Training Readiness Evaluation is performed by a team
which examines a crew's qualification records, the ship's safety program,
and the physical readiness of the ship to go to sea and engage in
Refresher Training. The evaluation team determines whether the ship
can be allowed to continue with phase three training and provides the
ship a list of discrepancies that need to be corrected.
Because all ships sooner or later will be certified ready to con-
tinue training, this study uses the number of deficiencies cited by the
inspection team as a measure of training effectiveness. Because a higher
measure indicates poorer performance, it is expected that Training
Readiness Evaluation measures will positively correlate with turnover.
5. Operational Propulsion Plant Examination (OPPE)
The Operational Propulsion Plant Examination score measures
the extent to which a crew is able to safely operate its engineering plant.
The inspection is administered by the Propulsion Examining Board at
least once during each competitive cycle. Watch standers take written
tests tailored to the watch station for which they are reportedly qualified.
Following the written test and an equipment inspection, the ship gets
underway so that the engineering team can be observed during routine
operations, imposed casualties, and damage control drills. Upon comple-
tion of the OPPE, the ship receives either a satisfactory or an unsatisfac-
tory grade.
Each ship must pass the OPPE; therefore, the Propulsion
Examining Board conducts re-inspections until a satisfactory score is
earned. To reveal variation across ships, this study uses each ship's first
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OPPE score received in tJie 18-month period. The verbal scores have been
converted to numerical measures: unsatisfactory=0, satisfactory= 1 . It is
expected that OPPE scores will be negatively correlated with turnover
rates.
B. SELECTION OF A TURNOVER MEASURE
For this thesis, a turnover measure is desired that has the broadest
of meanings. There have been studies that have examined the determi-
nants of turnover; these studies typically point to issues like demo-
graphic, job satisfaction, tenure, and economic variables. This study
acknowledges that these are the many possible factors subsumed by a
broad turnover definition.
However, setting these factors aside for this study allows the
research to focus on the hypothesized relationship between turnover and
effectiveness.
Turnover is defined in this study as a rate computed by dividing the
number of individuals assigned to a unit at any point during the 18
months by the number of billets authorized for budget purposes. This
measure does not reveal under what circumstances service members
arrived at or left a command. It can, however, reveal to what extent per-
sonnel movement occurred aboard a unit during the period in question.
C. SCOPE
The sample consists of 169 surface ships under the command of
Commander, Naval Surface Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet. All are included
except those for which data are unavailable due to missing or
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non-existent reports. The latest 18-month period for which data are
available for all variables in this thesis is October 1987 through March
1989. An 18-month period has been chosen consistent with the length of
a competitive cycle.
D. DATA SOURCES
The raw data on all performance measures have been provided by
the staff of Commander, Naval Surface Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet, head-
quartered in San Diego, California. A list of Unit Identification Codes
(UICs) was supplied to the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) in
Monterey, California. Technicians at DMDC extracted from the six perti-
nent quarterly Enlisted Master Records (EMRs) the total number of
enlisted social security numbers associated with each UlC at any point in
time during the 18-month period. If a social security number appeared in
one of the quarterly reports, it was included in the output supplied to the
author. Additionally, DMDC provided the number of authorized billets for
each UIC for 1988. It is assumed for this study that the 1988 authorized
billet structure is relatively constant during the period in question;
authorized billet numbers change only once a year and changes are not
usually significant. It is also assumed that differences between the num-
ber of authorized billets and actual manning on board each ship during
the period are systematic across the sample and will not introduce signif-
icant error in the analysis.
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E. ANALYSIS TECHNIQUE
Although several performance measures have been chosen for this
thesis, it cannot be presumed that they represent all the variables that
indicate a unit's effectiveness. Further, it cannot be assumed that
turnover is the only variable that affects unit performance. Preliminary
analysis thus cannot include models of causality. The variables them-
selves are unsuitable for some classical statistical procedures. However,
one may hypothesize how the variables might be related.
To measure the degree of association between turnover rates and the
effectiveness variables, Pearson Correlation Coefficients (r) have been
computed. This test is useful for making inferences about the association
between two variables (Neter, et al., 1989). Correlation coefficients range
from -1 (perfectly negative relationship between variables) to 1 (perfectly
positive relationship between variables). Correlation coefficients have
been computed between turnover rates and the measures of effectiveness
as well as among the measures of effectiveness themselves.
Conclusions made from this technique are cursory at best. However,
relationships discovered among the variables during this effort can be
considered a first step toward a better understanding of the links that
may exist between cohesion, personnel turnover, and effectiveness.
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IV. RESULTS
Pearson Correlation tests are shown in Table 1 for turnover rates
and measures of effectiveness. The following is an explanation of the val-
ues in the table.
The table is divided into cells; each cell corresponds to a test of cor-
relation between turnover rates and each measure of effectiveness (read
down the left side of table). The top numbers in each cell are the Pearson
Correlation Coefficients (r). They measure the strength of the relation-
ships between two variables and range from -1 to 1. A correlation coeffi-
cient of 1 indicates a perfectly positive relationship between two
variables; if one variable has a high vEilue, so does the second variable.
Similarly, a correlation coefficient of -1 indicates a perfectly negative rela-
tionship between two variables. A correlation coefficient of means that
there is no systematic relationship between the values of the two vairi-
ables. Correlation coefficients between these extremes indicate relatively
strong to weak bivariate relationships.
The second number is the significance level. Each coefficient of cor-
relation has an associated significance level that indicates the probability
that the coefficient was generated by chance. The closer the significance
level is to 0, the more likely one can conclude that the correlation coeffi-
cient was not generated randomly; therefore, some other meaning may be
ascribed to the coefficient. For this thesis, attention will be focused on
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*Each cell represents a test of correlation between turnover
rates and each measure of effectiveness (MOE) (read down
the left side of the table) for the period of October 1987
through March 1989. The first number of each cell is the
correlation coefficient. The second number is the significance
level. The third number is the sample size on which the cor-
relation coefficient was computed.
**Significant at .10 level
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The third number in each cell is the sample size on which the corre-
lation coefficient was computed. Variation in sample size occurs across
the measures of effectiveness because not all ships undergo all the tests
and inspections during a given cycle (for reasons including overhauls,
deployments, and so on).
A. NAVAL SURFACE FORCE, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET RESULTS
Across the entire sample, three of the seven effectiveness variables
correlated significantly with the turnover rate variable. First-term reten-
tion rates, however, are positively correlated with turnover rates, a result
that is counterintuitive. This may be because many first-term reenlistees
sign reenlistment contracts in return for further schooling or guaranteed
reassignment.
Turnover rates and career retention rates are negatively correlated,
as expected. This indicates that, to a certain extent, a high turnover rate
corresponds to a lower career retention rate. The third significant and
expected relationship is found between turnover rates and 3M Inspection
scores. Higher turnover rates correspond with lower performance in this
maintenance evaluation.
The sample was broken down by ship class to further assess the
relationships between turnover and measures of performance. In Table 2,
it can be seen that for guided missile destroyers (DDGs), there is a signif-
icant negative correlation between the Supply Management Assessment
and turnover. However, due to the small sample size of this cell (N=4), it
would be imprudent to draw conclusions about the relationship. An
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*Each cell represents a test of correlation between turnover
rates and each measure of effectiveness (MOE) (read down
the left side of the table) for the period of October 1987
through March 1989. The first number of each cell is the
correlation coefficient. The second number is the significance
level. The third number is the sample size on which the cor-
relation coefficient was computed.
**Significant at .10 level
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unexpected relationship is found between the Training Readiness Evalu-
ation and turnover. This cell indicates that high turnover correlates with
good performance (recall that a positive sign was expected for this
relationship).
Table 3 shows the correlation coefficients for the destroyers (DDs).
Two significant relationships are found. As with the large sample, turn-
over and first-term retention rates correlate significantly in the unex-
pected direction. Turnover and OPPE scores show a coefficient that is
negatively signed, as expected.
Table 4 reveals that for the guided missile cruisers (CGs), only one
correlation coefficient is significant; however, it is positively signed, which
is inconsistent with expectations and with the coefficient in the large
sample.
B. SUMMARY
The majority of the cells did not indicate significant relationships
between turnover and measures of effectiveness. Further, those cells that
were significant often only offered correlation coefficients indicating weak
to moderate relationships (high coefficients came from very small sam-
ples). Some of the relationships were contrary to expectation and coun-
terintuitive. Given these weaknesses and inconsistencies, one must be
very cautious when drawing conclusions about the relationships.
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*Each cell represents a test of correlation between turnover
rates and each measure of effectiveness (MOE) (read down
the left side of the table) for the period of October 1987
through March 1989. The first number of each cell is the
correlation coefficient. The second number is the significance
level. The third number is the sample size on which the cor-
relation coefficient was computed.
**Significant at .10 level
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*Each cell represents a test of correlation between turnover
rates and each measure of effectiveness (MOE) (read down
the left side of the table) for the period of October 1987
through March 1989. The first number of each cell is the
correlation coefficient. The second number is the significance
level. The third number is the sample size on which the cor-
relation coefficient was computed.
**Significant at .10 level
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C. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
Statistics describing turnover and the measures of effectiveness for
the large sample and the ship type samples are provided in Appendix A.
Correlation coefficient tables similar to those examined in this chapter
are included in Appendix B for additional ship types. Appendix C offers
correlation tables for the measures of effectiveness themselves. Although
not a specific issue addressed in this thesis, studies of intercorrelations
among the effectiveness measures might reveal interesting results.
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. CONCLUSIONS
One must be cautious when ascribing meaning to bivariate relation-
ships such as correlation coefficients. Much more information tham can
be revealed using bivariate analysis is hidden in the variables. Multivari-
ate techniques would reveal more about the intricate relationships
among the variables, but the data used for this thesis do not readily lend
themselves to use of multivariate procedures. A discussion of the rela-
tionships found during this study, however, should provide a starting
point for assessing the links between measures of effectiveness, turnover,
and cohesion.
Across the large sample, only two significant expected relationships
were found between turnover and the measure of effectiveness variables
(Career Retention, 3M Inspection). The coefficients can be said to imply
that, to a certain extent, as personnel turnover rates grow, career reten-
tion and material maintenance efforts suffer. One might interpret the
degraded retention performance as the result of an unstable personnel
atmosphere aboard ship; this environment may hurt a command's ability
to convince those personnel who are at the end of their second term of
service to reenlist. The statistical relationship found between the 3M
inspection and turnover may imply that personnel turbulence prevents
work station personnel from recei\ang proper maintenance training or
equipment indoctrination. These inadequacies may then prevent
43
maintenance personnel from spending the necessary time on the job
actually performing the preventive maintenance.
The remaining relationships across the large sample were either
unexpected or not statistically significant. Across all the samples, the
relationships were often small, inconsistent, or counterintuitive. There
are many possible reasons for these weaknesses. For example:
• The turnover rate derived from the DMDC files may not accurately
reflect the actual turnover that is occurring aboard the ships. The
difference between the ships' billet authorizations and their actual
manning may introduce error into the calculated turnover rate. This
error would skew the results if it were not systematic across the
sample.
• The measures of effectiveness may lack reliability and validity.
Muchinsky (1987) discusses measures as predictors of future crite-
ria. In a military setting, one important criterion for which predictive
measures should be developed is combat readiness. The notion of
reliability of effectiveness measures means that they should yield the
same estimates of criteria on repeated use. Validity refers to accu-
racy and precision: Does the measure yield a correct estimate of
what is being assessed? Is the measure appropriate for drawing
inferences about readiness? If the measures of effectiveness chosen
for this thesis are not reliable and valid, then one cannot draw accu-
rate inferences from them; systematically, they would be flawed.
• The measures of effectiveness may not be administered consistently
and in a systematic fashion. Ships do not undergo the various eval-
uations in the same sequence. Ships are evaluated by different
inspectors who may or may not be biased in some way toward a
particular ship. The inspectors each may rate performance differ-
ently; they may grade leniently, they may respond to the "halo
effect," or they may have a tendency to avoid assigning extreme
grades to a ship (Muchinsky, 1987).
• The effectiveness measures chosen may not reflect ship-wide per-
formance (the turnover rate reflects ship-wide turnover). For exam-
ple. Supply Department personnel would be more interested in the
Supply Management Assessment than would Engineering personnel.
• There may be no systematic relationship between personnel turnover
and shipboard effectiveness.
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It is the author's opinion that nearly all weaknesses of the empirical
portion of this paper can be attributed to the effectiveness measures.
Having been assigned aboard surface units and participated in many
inspections, the author has observed that, without exception, all evalua-
tions suffer from many of the problems described above. Other consider-
ations when examining measures of effectiveness must include the
inspector's subjective notions and preconceptions about a unit, parochi-
alism, a command's climate, and many others.
Some other considerations should be taken into account when
assessing the results of the analysis. There is wide variation across ship
types and across ships within a class. The individual ships have different
schedules, are home-ported in different harbors, have had their equip-
ment modified in various ways, have had their manning levels altered
over the years due to changes in equipment or mission, and possess
many other unknown or undocumented characteristics introducing vari-
ability into the data used in this thesis. These variations make it difficult
to homogenize a sample for analysis of specific variables and their
relationships.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS
Continuing research in the area of turnover and effectiveness should
yield benefit to the Navy. If a definitive link can be found, then the Navy
can take steps to improve the personnel atmosphere. Some directions
research can take may include:
• Using other performance measures and examining the relationships
between them and turnover. There are numerous other measures
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that are available and could be used. Some examples are mainte-
nance down time, percentage of time ships are reported at various
readiness levels, unit award designees, weapons inspections, overall
squadron staff assessments, and many others. There are certainly
other effectiveness indicators that have yet to be identified. As dis-
cussed above, there are those who believe subjective measures of
effectiveness should be identified. (Havron, 1984)
• Trying different methods to construct or aggregate measures. For
example, factor analysis could be used to derive a "single score"
performance measure for future turnover studies.
• Trying other methods to define turnover. One can calculate turnover
using methods that include or exclude different individuals from the
resulting figure. Future studies may need a turnover measure that
has a narrower meaning. For example, the extent to which first-term
attrition affects turnover rates may be interesting.
• (Related to the above recommendation) Examining the determinants
of turnover. Possible reasons include attrition, job rotation, further
training, separation at EAOS, illness, and so on.
• Examining the relationships among the performance measures
themselves. What are the intercorrelations? Does the result of one
engineering-related inspection predict the outcome of another one?
• Trying other ways of defining a sample population. Lx)oking for units
with similar schedules, examining turnover across different occupa-
tional ratings, or finding units that were assessed by the same indi-
vidual during a given inspection should yield useful results.
• Using a shorter interval of time than the 18 months used here. This
might reduce the effects of many non-turnover variables on ship
performance.
The link between cohesion, turnover, and effectiveness should be
studied further. If a link were found, the possibilities for improving per-
formance through tighter cohesion could be explored by the Navy. Future
research in this direction can attempt to answer the following questions:
• What are the indicators of a cohesive unit? Can a cohesion measure
be developed for Navy leadership to use?
• Are there levels in Na\y organizations in which cohesion is impor-
tant? Does a sailor identify most strongly with his watch section, his
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division, his department, his ship, his squadron, or the Navy as a
whole? If an organizational level can be identified, is it appropriate?
If it is not, can organizational behavior be manipulated to the extent
that individuals will bond at the appropriate level?
• How long does it take a unit with personnel stability to reach a
"state of cohesion"— a state that might provide for improved
effectiveness?
• Is there a relationship between naval technology and unit cohesion?
As technical complexity increases and individuals specialize, how do
unit norms change? Are organizational goals subordinated to indi-
vidual goals?4
• Is there a relationship between leadership styles and unit cohesion?
Can the behavior of the commanding officer be measured with
respect to his or her unit's cohesiveness?
• Assuming the above questions can be answered, how might the
Navy's personnel system be manipulated to create a more cohesive
atmosphere? Can the Navy adopt a system similar to the Army's
COHORT or Regimental Systems? Can the Navy create, for example,
a cohesive squadron of surface units— a squadron in which a sailor
remains for an entire career? Hypothetically, the sailor could be
promoted up the ranks within the squadron, could be rotated to
various jobs within a group of ships, and could spend shore tours at
the squadron headquarters engaged in activities that directly sup-
port his squadron.
The Navy faces an uncertain future with respect to its resources. As
of this writing, deep budget cuts appear imminent. How the Navy
responds to these pressures surely will affect the personnel climate. The
more tools Navy personnel policy planners have at their disposal, the bet-
ter the resulting policies should be. Useful tools that should be developed
include those which will reveal the importance of turnover to the overall
"^These questions come to mind when considering recent incidents,
including the USS VINCENNES missile attack on the Iranian airliner and
the USS IOWA turret explosion.
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climate on a ship. Manpower planners already know that turnover is
expensive in the context of a military budget. If they find that an addi-
tional cost of high turnover is reduced unit cohesion and effectiveness,
then the planners might be more likely to consider fundamental changes
to the Navy's personnel rotation system.
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APPENDIX A
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR TURNOVER AND MOE VARIABLES
Variable Mean Minimum Maximum N
Naval Surface Force, U. S. Pacific Fleet
First Term Retention 32.62 0.00 83.33 171
Second Term Retention 64.09 7.14 100.00 166
Career Retention 74.86 0.00 100.00 170
Supply Assessment 3.52 1.75 5.00 78
3M Inspection 87.80 75.00 95.00 109
Training Evaluation 106.89 23.00 255.00 98
Propulsion Examination 0.73 0.00 1.00 120
Turnover Rate 1.54 0.99 2.46 169
Guided Missile Destroyers (DDGs)
First Term Retention 30.87 13.61 56.55 15
Second Term Retention 64.95 11.11 100.00 15
Career Retention 76.22 48.89 96.97 15
Supply Assessment 3.25 2.75 3.75 4
3M Inspection 89.00 80.00 94.00 8
Training Evaluation 123.45 26.00 254.00 11
Propulsion Examination 0.70 0.00 1.00 10
Turnover Rate 1.51 1.44 1.58 15
Destroyers (DDs)
First Term Retention 34.13 21.56 73.99 15
Second Term Retention 61.32 33.94 76.67 14
Career Retention 72.96 7.46 100.00 15
Supply Assessment 3.63 2.50 4.25 10
3M Inspection 88.13 83.00 95.00 8
Training Evaluation 99.25 29.00 188.00 8
Propulsion Examination 0.82 0.00 1.00 11
Turnover Rate 1.51 1.45 1.60 12
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Variable Mean Minimum Maximum N
Cruisers (CGs)
First Term Retention 35.04 25.62 50.25 11
Second Term Retention 73.53 10.00 100.00 12
Career Retention 75.81 57.94 83.07 11
Supply Assessment 3.27 3.00 3.67 5
3M Inspection 89.00 86.00 95.00 7
Training Evaluation 97.43 50.00 139.00 7
Propulsion Examination 0.88 0.00 1.00 9
Turnover Rate 1.46 1.09 1.59 12
Guided Missile Frigates (FFGs)
First Term Retention 30.81 0.00 54.29 20
Second Term Retention 53.80 16.67 85.71 20
Career Retention 75.68 48.02 100.00 20
Supply Assessment 3.87 2.75 5.00 13
3M Inspection 88.00 79.00 95.00 13
Training Evaluation 98.23 45.00 181.00 13
Propulsion Examination 0.73 0.00 1.00 15
Turnover Rate 1.65 1.42 2.27 19
Frigates (FFs)
First Term Retention 32.89 18.54 63.58 25
Second Term Retention 61.90 7.14 100.00 25
Career Retention 77.65 57.41 100.00 25
Supply Assessment 3.10 1.75 4.25 10
3M Inspection 86.66 80.00 94.00 21
Training Evaluation 131.10 72.00 213.00 10
Propulsion Examination 0.59 0.00 1.00 22
Turnover Rate 1.58 1.45 2.26 25
Landing Ship Tank (LSTs)
First Term Retention 27.35 14.26 59.41 10
Second Term Retention 65.47 33.33 91.67 10
Career Retention 74.30 51.67 89.29 10
Supply Assessment 3.53 3.00 4.00 9
3M Inspection 89.60 82.00 95.00 5
Training Evaluation 79.13 45.00 122.00 8
Propulsion Examination 0.67 0.00 1.00 6
Turnover Rate 1.59 1.41 2.46 10
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APPENDIX B
CORRELATION TABLES FOR ADDITIONAL SHIP TYPES
TABLE B-1
PEARSON PRODUCT-MOMENT CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS*
































*Each cell represents a test of correlation between turnover rates and
each measure of effectiveness (MOE) (read down the left side of the
table) for the period of October 1987 through March 1989. The first
number of each cell is the correlation coefficient. The second number
is the significance level. The third number is the sample size on which
the correlation coefficient was computed.
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TABLE B-2

































*Each cell represents a test of correlation between turnover rates and
each measure of effectiveness (MOE) (read down the left side of the
table) for the period of October 1987 through March 1989. The first
number of each cell is the correlation coefficient. The second number
is the significance level. The third number is the sample size on which
the correlation coefficient was computed.
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TABLE B-3
PEARSON PRODUCT-MOMENT CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS*






























*Each cell represents a test of correlation between turnover rates and
each measure of effectiveness (MOE) (read down the left side of the
table) for the period of October 1987 through March 1989. The first
number of each cell is the correlation coefficient. The second number
is the significance level. The third number is the sample size on which
the correlation coefficient was computed.
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APPENDIX C
PEARSON PRODUCT-MOMENT CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS*





































































































*Each cell represents a test of correlation between two measures of effectiveness
(MOE). The first number of each cell is the correlation coefficient. The second num-
ber is the significance level. The third number is the sample size on which the corre-
lation coefficient was computed.
Significant at .10 level.
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